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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
GREENBURGH NO. 11 FEDERATION OF 
TEACHERS, 
Charging-Rarty, 
- and - CASE NO. U-20725 
GREENBURGH NO. 11 UNION FREE SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
JEFFREY R. CASSIDY, for Charging Party 
RAINS & POGREBIN, P.C. (TERENCE M. O'NEIL AND CRAIG L. OLIVO of 
counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Greenburgh No. 11 Union Free 
School District (District) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) finding that 
the District violated §§209-a.1(a) and (d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act) when it failed to respond to the requests of the Greenburgh No. 11 Federation of 
Teachers (Federation) for information necessary for the processing of three grievances 
at arbitration. 
The District argued that the Federation's improper practice charge was untimely 
filed, that the Federation had failed to comply with the notice of claim requirements of 
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Education Law, §3813, and that the Act imposed no obligation upon a public employer 
to provide information for the processing of a grievance once the employee 
organization had filed a demand for arbitration. The ALJ found that the charge was 
timely, the notice of claim requirements had been satisfied by the filing of the improper 
practice charge, and the duty to provide information did not end at arbitration. 
The District excepts to the ALJ's decision, making essentially the same 
arguments that it did before the ALJ. The Federation's response supports the ALJ's 
decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, including those made at oral argument, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
The Federation represents a unit of pedagogical employees of the District. In 
preparation for the arbitration of three grievances filed by the Federation claiming that 
the District had violated the class size provision of the parties' expired collective 
bargaining agreement, by letter dated October 8, 1998, the Federation requested that 
the District provide it with information regarding: 
class size(s) as of September 1, 1997, ...computer printouts for the 
class size(s) periodically during the 1997-98 school year..., the 
1997-98 variance notification forms signed by the District and 
submitted to the State Education Department, and copies of any 
correspondence sent to parents of children of the classes for which 
variances were sought in 1997-98. 
The arbitration hearings on the three grievances were scheduled for October 22, 
and November 9 and 12, 1998. Sometime between October 8 and 22, 1998, the three 
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arbitration hearings were adjourned. The November 9 arbitration was rescheduled to 
March 1,1999, then rescheduled again to April 7,1999. The November 12 arbitration 
hearing was rescheduled to May 6,1999.1 
Because the District had not responded to the Federation's October 8, 1998 
request for information, the Federation made a second request for the class size 
information on February 12, 1999 and a third request on February 26.2 The District did 
not respond to either of those requests. The instant charge was filed on March 10, 
1999. 
DISCUSSION 
Before we reach the merits of the Federation's improper practice charge, we 
must first determine whether the improper practice charge was timely filed and if the 
notice of claim requirements of §3813 of the Education Law have been met. The 
timeliness question here presented raises issues that we have not heretofore been 
called upon to decide. 
The ALJ found that each request for information necessary for the processing of 
grievances and the subsequent refusal or failure to provide the information requested 
1The record does not reflect the adjourned date for the October 22, 1998 
arbitration hearing. 
2The Federation informed the District in its February 26, 1999 request that, if the 
information sought was not provided within ten days, the Federation would file an 
improper practice charge. 
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constituted a separate violation of §§209-a.1(a) and (d) of the Act.3 Based upon that 
determination, she found the charge to be timely as to the February 12 and 26, 1999 
requests for information. She, therefore, did not reach the timeliness of the charge with 
respect to the Federation's October 8, 1998 request. 
The District argues that the October 8, 1998 request renders the charge untimely 
because that request was made more than four months prior to the filing of the 
improper practice charge.4 The District further argues that because the February 12 and 
26, 1999, demands were identical to the October 8, 1998 request, the demands cannot 
be treated as separate demands. 
The demands themselves are not in evidence but it is apparent that each 
request was for the same information, although apparently for different arbitrations, 
given the adjournment and subsequent rescheduling of all of the grievances. 
We find that the charge was timely filed. The Federation made a request for 
information on October 8, 1998. If the District had refused that demand, the 
Federation's time to file the charge would run from the date of the District's refusal. 
3Salmon River Cent. Sch. Dist, 20 PERB H4595 (1987), aff'd 21 PERB1J3006 
(1988). There, the request for information first took the form of a Freedom of 
Information Law request and was denied by the District. A subsequent demand was 
made simply for information necessary for the processing of a grievance. The ALJ 
found that the District violated the Act by refusing to provide the information requested 
in the second demand. We affirmed on the merits and did not decide the timeliness of 
the charge because timeliness was not raised. 
4PERB's Rules of Procedure, §204.1 (a), require that an improper practice charge 
be filed within four months of the occurrence of the act or acts alleged to be violative of 
the Act. 
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However, the District did nothing. It did not deny the request and it did not provide the 
information sought. Therefore, the Federation could have reasonably waited until the 
first arbitration hearing for the production of the information. The first arbitration was 
scheduled for October 22, 1998. Had the arbitration taken place as scheduled and had 
the District failed to provide the requested information at the arbitration, the 
Federation's time to file the improper practice charge would have run from that date. If 
the October 22 arbitration was the only one adjourned and the arbitration hearings 
scheduled for November 9 and 12, 1998 had taken place, and if the District failed to 
provide the requested information at those hearing dates, then the Federation's time to 
file would have run from those dates. 
However, all of the arbitration hearings were adjourned sometime between 
October 8 and October 22, 1998. The first rescheduled date was March 1, 1999. The 
question is thus presented: when did the violation occur? As we have pointed out, if the 
District had responded to the Federation's request, there would be a fixed date from 
which to measure our four-month statute of limitations.5 We have held that an improper 
practice charge must be filed within four months of when the charging party knew or 
should have known about the act or acts alleged to be violative of the Act.6 
5Rules of Procedure, §204.1 (a). 
6See Great Neck Water Pollution Control Dist, 27 PERB P057 (1994) 
(subsequent history omitted); County of Onondaga, 12 PERB 1J3035 (1979), confirmed, 
77 AD2d 783, 13 PERB 1J7011 (4th Dep't 1980); West Park Union Free Sch. Dist, 11 
PERB H3016 (1978); Board of Fire Comm'rs, Brighton Fire Dist, 10 PERB fl3091 
(1977); Captain's Endowment Ass'n, 10 PERB 1J3034 (1977). 
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In determining when a charging party knew or should have known that a violation 
occurred, when there is no act by a respondent with a specific date, we have employed 
the standard of reasonableness. For example, in charges alleging a failure to respond 
to a demand to bargain, we have found a charge timely filed where there was a two-
month-delayJn_respmdingio„a„deman.dJ^^ 
waited three months for a reply,8 and where sixteen months had elapsed between the 
request that an agreement be executed and the date the improper practice charge was 
filed.9 
The rationale applied in those cases is equally applicable here. When there is 
no response to a request for information necessary for the processing of a grievance, 
the party making the request may wait a reasonable time for a response before filing an 
improper practice charge alleging a failure to provide information. What constitutes a 
"reasonable" time must necessarily be determined on a case-by-case basis. We find, 
however, that in situations such as the one presented here, it is reasonable for a 
charging party to wait for the arbitration hearing to ascertain whether the information 
requested will be provided by the public employer. It was reasonable for the Federation 
to wait until the arbitration hearing to receive the information or the denial of its request 
from the District. As the arbitration hearings were adjourned and rescheduled, it was 
7Faculty Ass'n of the Community College of the Finger Lakes, 8 PERB H4510, at 
4527, affd, 8 PERB P044 (1975). 
8Sheriff and County of Oneida, 23 PERB 1(3037 (1990). 
9City of Niagara Falls, 23 PERB H3039 (1990). 
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reasonable for the Federation to wait until the first rescheduled date of the arbitration 
hearing, March 1,1999, to determine whether the District was going to comply with its 
request for information. Using that date, the Federation's charge, filed on March 10, 
1999, is timely. 
Using the rationale applied by the ALJ, we would likewise find the charge to be 
timely filed. The ALJ held that each demand for information and the subsequent denial 
or failure to respond was a separate violation. We have not had to deal directly with this 
timeliness issue before. We note that, in City of Rochester,10 the case relied upon the 
by ALJ, the subsequent demand for information was in a different form than the first 
request. 
However, we long ago articulated the principle that each demand to negotiate 
and each refusal gives rise to a new charge until the matter has ultimately been 
decided by us or resolved to the mutual satisfaction of the parties.11 In Village of 
Malone, we noted: 
The purpose of placing a four-month limitation on the period during 
which an improper practice charge can be filed is to prevent the 
prosecution of stale claims. Normally, a four-month period is an 
adequate period for a potential charging party to investigate and 
assess the acts of the potential respondent, to make a 
determination as to whether a charge should be filed and, in fact, to 
prepare and file the charge.12 
1029PERB H3070(1996). 
"Village of Malone, 8 PERB fl3045 (1975). 
12/d. at 3078. 
Board - U-20725 -8 
Likewise, in agency shop fee cases, we have held that each bi-weekly deduction of the 
agency fee could be considered a separate violation of the Act, giving rise to a new 
cause of action with each deduction.13 
Cases involving the right to negotiate and cases involving agency fee 
procedures_dealj«ith„basic_rights_affQrjdedJo^ 
to be represented in the negotiation of terms and conditions of employment14 and the 
right to participate in or to refrain from participating in an employee organization.15 So, 
too, have we recognized that the right of public employees to be represented in 
grievances is one of the most important afforded them by the Act and that the 
withholding of relevant grievance information necessarily interferes with that right.16 
We find that the same rationale should, therefore, apply to demands for 
information necessary for the processing of grievances. In cases involving a request for 
information necessary for the processing of grievances, contract administration or 
contract negotiations, each request for information and each subsequent refusal to 
provide information or failure to respond to the request gives rise to a separate violation 
of the Act. Therefore, the timeliness of a charge alleging a violation based upon the 
^United Univ. Professions, Inc. (Iden), 13 PERB1J3086 (1980). Accord New York 
State Pub. Employees Fed'n, 18 PERB 1J3059 (1985). 
14Act, §203. 
15Act, §202. 
^State of New York (Dep't of Health and Roswell Memorial Inst), 26 PERB 
113072(1993). 
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refusal to provide such information may be measured from the date of the last, not first, 
refusal to provide information.17 
Having determined that the date upon which the timeliness of the charge is 
based is March 1, 1999, we further determine that the Federation meets the notice of 
claim-requirements_oL^ 
received by the District within ninety days of March 1, 1999, as it accompanied the 
notice of conference sent by PERB on March 18, 1999, and the District's answer to the 
charge was filed on March 31, 1999. This satisfies the notice of claim requirement 
applicable to §209-a.1(d) allegations under the Act.19 Additionally, as we found in 
Mahopac Central School District,20 the notice of claim provisions of Education Law 
§3813 are not applicable to cases alleging a violation of §209-a.1(a), as those cases 
involve the vindication of the public's interest in the rights of organization and 
representation. 
We now turn to the merits of the charge. Neither of the parties disputes that the 
Act requires a public employer,to provide the bargaining agent with requested 
17See Incorporated Vill. of Lake Success, 28 PERB fl3073 (1995). 
18Under our finding that each demand for information and each refusal 
constitutes a separate violation of the Act, the notice of claim requirements would 
likewise be met. 
^Deposit Cent. Sch. Dist. v. PERB, 214 AD2d 288, 28 PERB 1J7013 (3d Dep't 
1995). In its decision, the Court held that the District's receipt of a copy of an improper 
practice charge from PERB provided it with notice of the claim against it within the 
"90-day period" required by Education Law §3813. 
'28 PERB 1T3045(1995). 
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"information necessary for the administration of a contract including the investigation of 
grievances."21 The obligation is "circumscribed by the rules of reasonableness, including 
the burden upon the employer to provide the information, the availability of the 
information elsewhere, the necessity therefor, [and] the relevancy thereof...."22 Here, the 
District argues that the grievance process is over once a demand for arbitration has 
been made and that the obligation to provide information to an employee organization 
ceases when the information is no longer necessary for the investigation and 
processing of grievances. The District likens the information requested by the 
Federation to discovery, which is inappropriate at arbitration. 
We have not previously decided this issue. However, the obligation of an 
employer to provide relevant and necessary information to an employee organization 
for the processing of grievances, even at arbitration, has been found to exist by the 
courts, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), and several of the states' public 
sector labor relations boards. The decisions of the NLRB and the other labor boards, 
while not binding, are nonetheless instructive in areas where PERB has yet to venture. 
In NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co.,23 the United States Supreme Court enforced a 
decision of the NLRB which held that an employer violated the duty to bargain by 
refusing to furnish requested information that would allow a union to decide whether or 
21Board of Educ, City Sch. Dist. of the City of Albany, 6 PERB TJ3012, at 3030 
(1973). 
22/d. 
23385US432(1967). 
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not to process a grievance to arbitration. Finding that the duty of an employer to furnish 
information relevant to the processing of a grievance does not terminate when the 
grievance is taken to arbitration, in Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. NLRB,24 the court 
considered a union request for information concerning five grievances that awaited 
arMrjatipnJiearings..The Sixth Circuit enforced the NLRB's order, finding that the union 
had a statutory right to the information. Other circuit courts have found that the duty of 
an employer to furnish information relevant to the processing of a grievance does not 
terminate when the grievance is taken to arbitration.25 In Chesapeake and Potomac 
Telephone Co. v. NLRB,26 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held: 
Sound reasons exist for not terminating a party's discovery rights 
merely because arbitration has been invoked. Reasonable 
discovery of material relevant to a grievance prior to an arbitration 
hearing enables a union to make an informed evaluation of the 
merits of its claim and to withdraw the arbitration demand or settle 
the grievance if the information indicates that the grievance is less 
meritorious than it had originally believed, thus eliminating delay 
and expense that might otherwise be incurred. [The employer's] 
argument that the failure to cut off discovery will delay the 
arbitration process because the parties will litigate before the Board 
the issue of whether evidence must be disclosed, misses the mark. 
Arbitration may to the same extent be delayed by requests for 
materials made before it is actually invoked. Moreover, failure to 
request relevant information until after arbitration is invoked may be 
. attributed to the fact that union officials who handle grievance 
steps, unlike skilled lawyers who enter when arbitration is 
24325 F2d 746 (6th Cir. 1963), cert, denied, 376 US 971 (1964). 
25See Wilkes-Barre Pub. Co. v. Newspaper Guild of Wilkes-Barre, 9559 F Supp 
875, 113 LRRM 340 (D. Pa., 1982); Cook Paint & Varnish Co. v. NLRB, 648 F2d 712 
(DC Cir. 1981); NLRB v. Davol, Inc., 597 F2d 782 (1st Cir. 1979). 
;687 F2d 633, at 636 (CA2, 1992). 
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demanded, may not appreciate the necessity for uncovering and 
marshalling evidence bearing on the strengths and weaknesses of 
the union's case in order to decide how to proceed. Reasonable 
delay of arbitration for this purpose is therefore justifiable. 
The NLRB also has consistently held that the duty to disclose does not cease 
when a union demands arbitration.27 Likewise, several of the state labor relations 
boards have followed the NLRB's holdings in cases involving requests for information 
relevant to the processing of a grievance even when the parties are at arbitration.28 
We find, therefore, that a public employer's duty, consistent with the policies and 
intent of the Act, is to provide relevant information necessary for the processing of a 
grievance through arbitration, even though the information may also be available 
through a subpoena issued by the arbitrator. We further find that the information 
requested by the Federation on October 8, 1998, and February 12 and 26,1999, was 
necessary and relevant for the processing of the grievances originally scheduled for 
arbitration on October 22 and November 9 and 12, 1998. We find, therefore, that the 
27See St. Joseph's Hosp. (Our Lady of Providence Unit), 97 LRRM 1212 (1997); 
Fawcett Printing Corp., 82 LRRM 1661 (1973); Fafnir Bearing Co., 56 LRRM 1108 
(1964), enforced, 362 F2d 716 (2d Cir. 1966). 
28Delaware State Univ. v. Delaware State Univ. ChapterAAUP, 165 LRRM 2084 
(2000) (Delaware Board found it was an improper practice to fail to provide information 
for the processing of a grievance. At the time information was requested, the grievance 
was at arbitration); State ofNJ, OER v. CWA, AFL-CIO, 13 NJPER 18284 (1987) (New 
Jersey PERC adopted NLRB standard and, while recognizing the right of a party to, 
subpoena information may be more efficient when at arbitration rather than invoking 
PERC's jurisdiction, held that information may still be required pursuant to New Jersey's 
statute and decisions); West Hartford Bd. ofEduc. v. Conn. State Bd. of Labor Rei, 116 
LRRM 2996 (1983) (Connecticut Board adopted NLRB standard). 
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District violated §§209-a.1(a) and (d) of the Act when it failed to respond to the 
Federation's requests for information 
Based on the foregoing, we deny the exceptions filed by the District and affirm 
the decision of the ALJ. 
IT IS, THEREFORE. ORDERED that the District forthwith provide to the 
13 
Federation the information requested by the Federation on October 8,1998, and 
February 12 and 26, 1999. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the District sign and post notice in the form 
attached at all locations ordinarily used by it to post written communications to unit 
employees. 
DATED: December 8, 2000 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
hn T. Mitchell, Member 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE " 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the Greenburgh No. 11 Union Free School District (District) in 
the bargaining unit represented by the Greenburgh No. 11 Federation of Teachers (Federation) 
that the District will forthwith provide to the Federation the information requested by the 
Federation on October 8,1998 and February 12 and 26,1999. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
Greenburgh No. 11 Union Free School District 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or 
covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
HERBERT L. LEVY, 
Gharging-Party; : 
- a n d - CASE NO. U-21900 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES FEDERATION, 
Respondent. 
HERBERT L. LEVY, pro se 
) BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on exceptions filed by Herbert L. Levy to a decision of 
the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) dismissing 
an improper practice charge alleging that the Public Employees Federation (PEF) 
violated §209-a.2(c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by refusing to 
represent him in a proceeding to vacate an arbitrator's award pursuant to Article 75 of 
the New York State Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR). 
FACTS 
On August 17, 2000, Herbert L. Levy fiied an improper practice charge against 
PEF. By letter dated August 23, 2000, the Assistant Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Assistant Director) advised Levy that his charge was 
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deficient because "[t]he 'facts' pled do not establish that PEF's refusal to commence a 
CPLR Article 78 proceeding was arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith." 
By letter dated August 28, 2000, Levy replied and enclosed copies of the 
pleadings and memorandum of law which he submitted pro se to Supreme Court in an 
effort-to-vacate-the-arbitrator-'s award _...- ^ . . . _ 
In response to Levy's letter of August 28, 2000, the Assistant Director advised 
him that his amendment was also deficient. He wrote: 
Neither the amendment nor the content of the attachment thereto is 
sworn and the letter is also undated and unsigned. 
As a charging party, it is your obligation, not PERB's, to allege facts 
which would establish that PEF's refusal to pursue your grievance 
to an Article 75 (not Article 78, as indicated in my August 23 letter) 
proceeding was arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith. The facts 
alleged would not do so. 
I note that the memorandum referred to in Ms. Greenberg's April 
28, 2000 letter was not included with your filing and it does not 
appear that your memorandum of law was before PEF when it 
made its decision. Moreover, even if its decision arguably was in 
error, such error would not, in itself, be a violation of the Act. 
Levy replied, by letter dated September 11, 2000, to the Assistant Director's 
letter and following this correspondence the Director dismissed the charge on 
September 22, 2000. 
EXCEPTIONS 
Levy excepted on the grounds that the Director's decision is arbitrary, 
discriminatory and/or made in bad faith. 
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DISCUSSION 
Since we are loath to substitute our judgment for that of an employee 
organization, we have established a limited basis upon which a breach of the duty of 
fair representation may be shown. Absent evidence that an action taken is arbitrary, 
diseriminatery-oHn-badHalthra-violati^ 
The Assistant Director advised Levy of the deficiencies contained within his 
original charge. The amendments which followed did not address those deficiencies. 
Instead, Levy submitted documents which failed to specify how PEF's conduct as it 
relates to the charge was arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith. On the contrary, Levy 
attached a letter from PEF to his charge which advised him that in PEF's opinion there 
were no grounds to vacate the arbitrator's decision. It is not our role to search through 
documents in an effort to discern and articulate the existence of a charge.2 
Upon our review of the pleadings, we find that Levy has failed to make a prima 
facie showing of arbitrary, discriminatory or bad faith conduct on the part of PEF. While 
Levy alleges that PEF was careless, inept and ineffective in the manner in which it 
'See CSEA, Local 1000, AFSCME (Heffelfinger), 32 PERB 1J3044 (1999); Public 
Employees Fed'n, AFL-CIO, and State of New York (Dep't of Health), 29 PERB 1J3027 
(1996); CSEA v. PERB and Diaz, 132 AD2d 430, 20 PERB 1J7024 (3d Dep't 1987), aff'd 
on other grounds, 73 NY2d 796, 21 PERB ^7017 (1988). 
2See State of New York (Workers' Compensation Bd.) and CSEA, Inc., 29 PERB 
fl3054 (1996); State of New York (Div. of Parole) and Security and Law Enforcement, 
Council 82, AFSCME, 27 PERB fl3016 (1994). 
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handled his complaints, we, as well as the courts, have held that such allegations do 
not evidence a breach of the duty of fair representation.3 
Based on the foregoing, Levy's exceptions are denied and the decision of the 
Director is affirmed. 
^IXIS1-XHEHEEORE,-OHDEREDJhaLthe_charge-mustbe,„and-it_hereby-is, — 
dismissed. 
DATED: December 8, 2000 
Albany, New York 
Michgieljte. Cuevas, Chairman 
/ John T. Mitchell, Member 
; 3Supra note 1. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
MARTIN FREEDMAN, 
eharging-Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-21940 
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, 
Respondent, 
-and-
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 
) 
Employer. 
MARTIN FREEDMAN, pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on exceptions filed by Martin Freedman to a decision of 
the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) dismissing 
his improper practice charge. The charge, sworn to August 30, 2000, alleged, inter 
alia, that the United Federation of Teachers (UFT) violated §209-a.2(c) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by not responding to his request to initiate a 
grievance addressing conduct by his employer, the Board of Education of the City 
; 
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School District of the City of New York (District). The District is made a party to this 
proceeding pursuant to §209-a.3 of the Act.1 
FACTS 
On September 5, 2000, Freedman filed an improper practice charge alleging 
UF^faiIed40-initiate-a-grievanGe-against4he-DistriGt-for"an-aIleged-aGt-that-oeGurred-on 
May 22, 2000. 
On September 6, 2000, the Assistant Director of Public Employment Practices 
and Representation (Assistant Director) informed Freedman that his charge was 
deficient because "[t]his charge was filed only two and one-half weeks after [his] 
request was mailed to UFT on August 14. A failure to respond within that time frame 
does not, in itself, establish arbitrary, discriminatory or bad faith conduct." 
On September 12, 2000, Freedman responded to the Assistant Director's letter 
and informed him that in fact "two and a half weeks [is] more than enough time to 
respond, [because] it is imperative that action be taken within that time frame. 
Grievances are time sensitive and must be presented within 30 days of a contract 
violation." 
1Section 209-a.3 of the Act provides: 
[T]he public employer shall be made a party to any charge filed 
under [§209-a.2] which alleges that the duly recognized or certified 
employee organization breached its duty of fair representation in 
the processing of or failure to process a claim that the public 
employer has breached its agreement with such employee 
organization. 
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On October 4, 2000, the Director dismissed the charge as deficient after 
consideration of the facts which gave rise to the alleged improper practice. We agree. 
DISCUSSION 
Section 204.1(a)(1) of PERB's Rules of Procedure (Rules) mandates that 
improper-praGtiGe-Gharges-be-filed-within4our-months-0f~the date-of-the-GonduGt-which 
is the subject of the charge. Furthermore, the Rules do not provide for any extension of 
time to file an improper practice charge.2 We have also determined that the filing period 
is not tolled while ancillary proceedings [grievance arbitration] are being pursued by or 
on behalf of a charging party, even when those proceedings have the potential to 
effectively moot the improper practice alleged.3 
In order for Freedman to establish a claim for breach of duty of fair 
representation against UFT, he must show that the activity, or lack thereof, which 
formed the basis of the charges against UFT was deliberately invidious, arbitrary or 
founded in bad faith.4 
Under certain circumstances, a union's failure to respond to requests to file a 
grievance may result in a violation of the Act.5 However, in this case, the request was 
moot. Freedman acknowledged that the event which triggered the alleged contract 
2See Public Employees Fed'n (Mankowski), 33 PERB fl3032 (2000). 
3See Transport Workers Union, Local 100 (Hokai), 32 PERB 1J3019 (1999). 
4See CSEA v. PERB and Diaz, 132 AD2d 430, 20 PERB 1J7024, at 7039 (3d 
Dep't 1987), aff'don other grounds, 73 NY2d 796, 21 PERB H7017 (1988). 
5United Fed'n of Teachers (Grassel), 23 PERB 1J3042 (1990). 
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violation occurred on May 22, 2000. According to Freedman, a grievance must then be 
"presented within 30 days of a contract violation." By any calculation of time, workdays 
or calendar days, more than thirty days had elapsed when Freedman made his 
August 13, 2000 request. We cannot, therefore, conclude that, under the 
GirGumstanceSy-UF^s^ailur^^ — 
bad faith, arbitrary or discriminatory. 
Based on the foregoing, Freedman's exceptions are denied and the Director's 
decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: December 8, 2000 
Albany, New York 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
These cases come to us on exceptions filed by the Buffalo Police Benevolent 
Association (PBA) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on six 
consolidated improper practice charges filed by Marvin V. Sanford (Case No. U-20907), 
Richard D. Woods (Case No. U-20987), Johnnie A. Fritz, Jr. (Case No. U-21001), 
Tomar Hubbard (Case No. U-21005), Bradford Pitts (Case No. U-21006) and Robert W. 
Yeates (Case No. U-21010) (collectively, charging parties), finding that the PBA had 
breached its duty of fair representation owed to the charging parties as employees in 
the unit represented by the PBA, in violation of §209-a.2(c) of the Public Employees' 
Fair Employment Act (Act). The charging parties are police officers, formerly detectives, 
employed by the City of Buffalo (City).1 Two of the charging parties, Woods and Fritz, at 
all times have been represented by counsel and have filed exceptions and cross-
1The City was made a statutory party to the proceedings pursuant to §209-a.3 of 
the Act. 
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exceptions to the ALJ's decision.2 Sanford, Hubbard, Pitts and Yeates appeared pro se 
and have not responded to the exceptions. The City, likewise, has not responded to the 
PBA's exceptions. 
BACKGROUND 
In-l-QQSy-the-New^York-Courtof-Appeals-invalidated Civil-Service-Law-(CSL) 
§58(4)(c), which conferred permanent status as detective on police officers who had 
been temporarily assigned to perform detective duties for a period of eighteen months 
or more.3 The Court held that the statute violated the merit and fitness clause of the 
New York State Constitution because it compelled a municipality to appoint an officer 
as a detective. The decision held that if the position of detective was promotional, it was 
appropriate for a competitive Civil Service examination. Pursuant to legislation which 
was signed into law on June 25, 1997, CSL §58(4)(c) was repealed and a new 
§58(4)(c) and §59-a were enacted.4 The new provisions of the CSL §58(4)(c) permit, 
but do not require, the placement of the position of detective into the classified Civil 
Service and provide that any person serving in the position of detective for at least 
2The cross-exceptions are actually a response to the PBA's exceptions. 
3Woods v. Irving, 85 NY2d 238 (1995). 
4At that time, CSL §58(4)(c) provided: 
Any person who has received permanent appointment as a 
police officer and who is temporarily assigned to perform the 
duties of a detective shall, whenever such assignment 
exceeds eighteen months in duration, be appointed as a 
detective and receive the compensation ordinarily paid to a 
detective performing such duties. 
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eighteen months on the date that position is classified shall receive a permanent 
appointment as a detective. Because of this legislation, the Buffalo Municipal Civil 
Service Commission (Commission) classified the positions of detective and detective 
sergeant5 on December 3, 1997.6 
—-Prior"to-Deeember~3H997T^deteetive-and-deteetive-sergeant-positions-within-the 
Buffalo Police Department (Department) were noncompetitive Civil Service positions. 
Appointment to the positions was at the sole discretion of the Police Commissioner. At 
all times relevant to these proceedings, Article 24 of the PBA-City collective bargaining 
agreement, which had expired on June 30, 1995, provided: 
Detectives, Detective Sergeants, Assistant Detective Chiefs 
and the Chief of Homicide, upon completion of eighteen 
months of service, shall not be removed from their 
respective positions except for cause. 
Fritz had been appointed as a detective effective February 17, 1997; Sanford, 
Woods and Yeates were appointed effective June 2, 1997; Pitts was appointed 
effective January 13,1998, and Hubbard was appointed as a detective effective August 
17, 1998. Effective December 3, 1997, the provisional detectives were notified that if he 
had achieved eighteen months continuous service as a detective as of that date, they 
5The Commission's actions with respect to the position of detective-sergeant are 
not part of the instant improper practice charges and will only be discussed hereafter as 
relevant to this decision. 
6ln 1996 the Police Commissioner petitioned the Commission to classify the 
positions of detective and detective sergeant. Due to discussions with the PBA, which 
opposed the proposed oral component of the Civil Service examination and was 
concerned about the "grandfathering" of provisional detectives and detective sergeants, 
the action of the Commission was delayed until its December 3, 1997 classification. 
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would be grandfathered into the position; otherwise they would be required to take the 
competitive exam to retain their positions. By letters dated December 12, 1997, Fritz, 
Sanford, Woods and Yeates were advised that as they did not have the requisite 
eighteen months of service, they were required to take the exam. The PBA thereafter 
met-with-representatives-of-the-Gity-and-the-Gommission-in-order-to-disGuss4he- — 
grandfathering of the detectives who did not have eighteen months of service as of 
December 3, 1997. In March 1998, the Commission decided to extend the 
grandfathering date from December 3, 1997, the date the position was classified, to 
June 20, 1998, the date of the written portion of the Civil Service examination.7 Other 
than Hubbard, each of the charging parties had been a detective for a period of from 
five to sixteen months by the examination date. 
FACTS 
The facts are set forth in detail in the ALJ's decision. The facts, as relevant to the 
exceptions, are summarized here. 
In response to the Commission's classification of the detective position, 
individual grievances were filed by Sanford, Woods and Fritz, and two class action 
grievances were filed by the PBA. The first class action grievance, GR98-14, was filed 
on January 15, 1998, alleging, inter alia, that Article 24 of the collective bargaining 
agreement had been violated. The grievance, in relevant part, states: "Detectives and 
Detective Sergeants have been advised that they are provisional and/or subject to 
7Five additional detectives were grandfathered as a result of the extension; 
however, none of the charging parties were included within that group. 
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competitive examination even though they are tenured under the parties' Collective 
Bargaining Agreement and cannot be removed except for cause." The grievance was 
heard at Step 3 and had been moved to arbitration as of the date of hearing in these 
matters. 
—-—The-PBA-filed-animproperpraGtiGe-Gharge-with PERBy-Gase-No^U-19657-y-on 
January 20, 1998, alleging that the City had violated §§209-a.1(d) and (e) of the Act by 
unilaterally removing tenure and permanent status from the detectives and deeming 
them provisional notwithstanding the provisions of the parties' expired collective 
bargaining agreement. After a pre-hearing conference, the charge was administratively 
closed by the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) on 
October 15,1998, due to the PBA's failure to respond to a status letter from the 
assigned ALJ. While the PBA's attorney knew that the improper practice charge had 
been dismissed, the PBA officers and the charging parties first learned about the 
dismissal during the processing of the instant matters. 
The second class action grievance, GR98-267, was filed by the PBA on 
September 2, 1998, alleging that the abolition of the detective position and its 
replacement with a competitive position, subject to oral examination, violated the 
collective bargaining agreement. That grievance was heard at Step 3 of the contractual 
grievance procedure and is awaiting arbitration. 
Sanford filed the first individual grievance, GR98-307, on December 11, 1998. 
He had been advised by John Juszkiewicz, PBA first vice-president and grievance 
chairman, in December 1997, that he would be protected by the other grievances that 
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were then pending and that since he did not have eighteen months of service as a 
detective at that time, he should wait to file his grievance until he had completed 
eighteen months of service. Sanford's grievance was heard at Step 3 on January 6, 
1999; at the hearing he was represented by the PBA. From December 1997 through 
Januaiy-19997-Sanford-was-reassured-by^ 
issue and that it would do everything it could to keep the detectives in their positions 
and eliminate the oral portion of the Civil Service examination. 
Woods testified to similar conversations with Juszkiewicz during the same time 
frame as Sanford. Woods was advised to let Juszkiewicz know when he received his 
notice to take the oral portion of the examination because the PBA would then take 
action. Woods filed his grievance, GR98-301, in December 1998, after he learned that 
Sanford had filed his grievance. The Step 3 hearing on Woods' grievance was held on 
August 5, 1999. The PBA thereafter issued an "intent to arbitrate" notice, but with the 
notation that it was to be placed on hold pending the outcome of Case No. U-19657.8 
There has been no activity on the grievance since the Step 3 hearing. 
Fritz testified that he received similar advice from Juszkiewicz when he spoke to 
him in February 1998: that there was no need for him to file an individual grievance 
since the PBA had already filed grievances that would cover him and that he did not yet 
have eighteen months in service as a detective. When Fritz attained eighteen months of 
service in August 1998, he was again advised by Juszkiewicz that he did not have to 
8By that time, Case No. U-19657 had already been administratively closed by the 
Director. 
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file an individual grievance because of the class action grievances. Upon learning, in 
January 1999, that other detectives had filed grievances, Fritz asked Juszkiewicz if he 
could file a grievance. Juszkiewicz approved and the grievance, GR99-2, was filed by 
Fritz on January 7, 1999 and was combined with Sanford's grievance. 
The~Gharging-parties-were-formally-notified-by4he-PoliGe-Gommissioner-on 
January 14,1999, that the Department was required to relieve them of their positions 
as detectives no later than March 25, 1999. Pursuant to the notification, the charging 
parties were removed from their positions as detectives and replaced by individuals 
from the competitive list. 
Throughout 1998 and into 1999, the PBA continually assured its members, 
y including the charging parties, that it was taking action on the issue of the detectives' 
classification and examination and that it "fully intends to pursue all avenues to address 
the numerous issues involved." In both bulletins to members and at monthly 
membership meetings, Robert T. Meegan, Jr., PBA president, informed members that 
the PBA had been instrumental in getting the Commission to change the tenure date for 
detectives from the date of the classification to the date of the examination, that the 
PBA still opposed the weight to be given to the oral component of the detective 
examination and that the PBA would work to eliminate that component, through the 
courts, if necessary, by seeking an injunction. 
In addition to these assurances, the PBA posted throughout the police 
department a list of the PBA's pending grievances and other legal matters. The list is 
also distributed at the PBA monthly meetings. The list, at all times relevant to the 
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instant proceedings, included Case No. U-19657 as pending, as well as the class action 
and individual grievances discussed above.9 
In December 1998, Sanford and some other detectives met with Juszkiewicz at 
the PBA office. The detectives had questions about the PBA's intentions regarding the 
issue-of4he-deteGtive-exam^Juszkiewicz-told4hem thaUhe-RBA was-doingeverything 
that could be done and that their questions should go to Meegan or the PBA attorney. 
In January 1999, Sanford and other detectives met with the PBA leadership. They 
requested that the PBA expedite the legal actions it had taken and that the PBA 
commence an Article 78 proceeding on their behalf. They were told that the PBA would 
not file an Article 78 petition because there were now bargaining unit members on the 
competitive list and the PBA "didn't want to get in the middle." Meegan told the 
detectives that there would be no further actions taken on the issue of the exam and the 
detectives'tenure. 
The charging parties thereafter retained private counsel and commenced an 
Article 78 proceeding, seeking a preliminary injunction to revoke the Civil Service 
examination and enjoin the City from removing the detectives from their positions until 
the Article 78 and the underlying grievances had been decided. A preliminary injunction 
issued on March 11,1999, along with an order to show cause which set the dates for 
appearance for March 23,1999, before State Supreme Court Judge Joseph D. Mintz. 
9The list also referenced numerous other matters as pending, when they, too, 
had been settled and/or closed. 
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On March 19, 1999, the PBA filed a motion to intervene in the Article 78 
proceeding. The affidavit in support of the motion and the accompanying answer to the 
petition contained arguments contrary to the assertions contained in the class action 
and individual grievances which, until that time, the PBA had supported and, indeed, 
"hadactively-pursued-on-behalfofthedetectives-
In the affidavit in support of its motion to intervene, the PBA argued that "there is 
no basis for continuing the Petitioners [the charging parties] in their respective 
positions."10 The PBA asserted that the charging parties "apparent reliance upon Article 
[24] of the subject collective bargaining agreement is wholly misplaced."11 The PBA 
further asserted that "the PBA has not filed an improper practice charge regarding the 
") implementation of competitive testing for detectives and detective sergeants,"12 and that 
while the [charging parties] claim that they have eighteen months of service, that 
eighteen months is only relevant "to the extent it predates December 3, 1997, the 
effective date that the detective position became subject to competitive testing."13 
Finally, the PBA in the affidavit asserts that the Commission erred when it allowed the 
June 1998 date (the date of the written portion of the Civil Service examination for 
10Charging party Exhibit #5: Affidavit in support of Motion to Intervene, fl24. 
"Charging party Exhibit #5: Affidavit in support of Motion to Intervene, 1J35. 
12Charging party Exhibit #5: Affidavit in support of Motion to Intervene, fl44. 
13/d. 
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detective) to be used as the date from which to measure the eighteen months of 
service. 
In its answer to the Article 78 petition, the PBA argues that the subject 
proceeding is untimely,14 that to the extent the collective bargaining agreement is relied 
upon7-the-charging~parties-have-failed-to-exhausMheiradministrative-remedies715"and 
that the City and the Commission were only empowered to cover-in detectives that had 
eighteen months of service as of the date the detective position was classified and not 
the date of the Civil Service examination.16 The answer specifically denied those 
portions of the petition that alleged that the PBA had filed a class action grievance 
alleging the same breach of contract as was asserted in Sanford's grievance and that 
the grievance was pending arbitration, and denied those portions of the petition that 
assert that the oral component of the examination rendered it "not competitive".17 
At oral argument, the PBA further asserted that the proceeding was untimely 
because the charging parties' cause of action had accrued on December 3, 1997, when 
the detective position was declared competitive. At the close of the oral argument, 
Justice Mintz found the petition to be untimely and did not reach any of the other issues 
presented in the petition. 
14Charging party Exhibit #5: Answer to the petition, 1J13. 
15Charging party Exhibit #5: Answer to the petition, 1J15. 
16Charging party Exhibit #5: Answer to the petition, 1J18 and 1J19. 
17Charging party Exhibit #5: Answer to the petition, fl6. 
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Meegan testified that the PBA intervened in the Article 78 proceeding because it 
was felt that the new Police Commissioner was not in favor of competitive testing for the 
detective position and that, as a result, the City would not support the Commission's 
designation of the detective position as competitive. At the time of the Article 78 
proeeedingrthere-wereunit-employeeswho-were-filling-deteetive-positions-pursuanHo 
their placement on the competitive list. 
Kathleen O'Hara, Assistant Corporation Counsel for the City, testified that the 
City had not expected the PBA to intervene in the Article 78 proceeding. She stated 
that, to the extent that the PBA's arguments in the Article 78 proceeding were contrary 
to the position it had taken in the grievances, she would use their arguments against 
them at arbitration. 
ALJ'S DECISION 
The ALJ found that the PBA breached its duty of fair representation and violated 
§209-a.2(c) of the Act by failing to provide true information to the members about 
matters which affect their employment by disseminating false or misleading information 
about the status of grievances and other legal actions undertaken on behalf of 
members. The ALJ also found a violation based upon the PBA's failure to act in good 
faith toward the charging parties by its conduct in the Article 78 proceeding. 
The ALJ ordered the PBA to reimburse the charging parties for any legal fees 
and related expenses which they incurred in the Article 78 proceeding. She also 
ordered the PBA to move all the related grievances to arbitration, to hire outside 
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counsel to represent the charging parties in the grievances and to pay such attorneys, 
and to consider each charging party as an aggrieved party in each of the grievances. 
EXCEPTIONS 
The PBA has raised forty-eight exceptions to the ALJ's decision, including 
argumentS"With-respeet-to-timeliness7-the-charging-parties-failure-to-meet-the-burden-of 
proof and numerous factual errors made by the ALJ in her decision. Woods and Fritz 
argue that the ALJ should have awarded costs, including reasonable legal fees, 
incurred in the prosecution of their improper practice charges. They further argue that 
the PBA should be ordered to update monthly the list of pending grievances and legal 
actions. Otherwise, they support the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ's decision in all but one respect. 
PRELIMINARY AND PROCEDURAL MATTERS 
We first address certain preliminary and procedural matters raised by the 
processing of these cases. 
In its brief to the ALJ, the PBA asserted for the first time that the improper 
practice charges are untimely. Section 212.4(1) of PERB's Rules of Procedure provides 
that an objection to the timeliness of an improper practice charge, if not duly raised, is 
waived. As timeliness was not raised as an affirmative defense in any of the PBA's 
answers to any of the improper practice charges, it is waived unless the untimeliness of 
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the charge or charges first became apparent at the hearing.18 The ALJ correctly found 
that timeliness was not raised at the hearing and did not first become apparent at the 
hearing. Therefore, the PBA's exception to the ALJ's decision on the timeliness of the 
charges is denied and the ALJ's decision in this respect is affirmed. 
H^he-matters-were-eonsolidated-for-hearing-bythe-AhJT^The-ALxl-permitted-the 
charging parties to be absent on some of the hearing dates, due to their duties as 
police officers, and because the underlying charges were virtually identical. All the 
charging parties, save one, Yeates, testified at the hearing. At the close of the charging 
parties' direct cases, the PBA made a motion to dismiss the charge as to Yeates, who 
had appeared at only the second day of hearing and who had not testified and had not 
introduced any evidence. The ALJ reserved decision on the PBA's motion.19 
In the decision, the ALJ denied the PBA's motion to dismiss as to Yeates, for the 
reason that she had advised the charging parties that they did not need to attend all the 
hearing dates and did not all need to present evidence in that their claims were the 
same, as long as each was satisfied that the others would adequately represent his 
interests. We do not agree with the ALJ's holding in this regard, with respect to the 
finding that the PBA misrepresented to the charging parties that the improper practice 
and grievances filed would be processed and that the PBA would protect their interests. 
There is no evidence in the record that Yeates ever fiied a grievance, requested that 
1£
"County of Nassau, 23 PERB 1J3051 (1990). 
19The PBA also moved that all the charges be dismissed for failure to sustain the 
burden of proof. The ALJ reserved decision on the motion and denied it in her decision. 
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the PBA file a grievance on his behalf or had any discussions with the PBA regarding 
his status as detective. The charge in Case No. U-21010 is, therefore, properly 
dismissed as to those allegations. With respect to the allegations relating to the PBA's 
actions in the charging parties' Article 78 proceeding, there is sufficient record evidence 
produced-by theother-charging-parties-to-sustain-Yeates-allegationsT^he-motion-to-— 
dismiss those allegations in Yeates' charge was properly denied by the ALJ in her 
decision. 
DISCUSSION 
It must first be said that we take no position as to the respective merits of the 
class action grievances, the individual grievances or the Article 78 proceeding brought 
by the charging parties. No determination is here made as to the likelihood of success 
on the merits of the grievances nor should one be construed. 
In order to establish a claim for breach of the duty of fair representation against a 
union, there must be a showing that the activity, or lack thereof, which formed the basis 
of the charges against the union was deliberately invidious, arbitrary or founded in bad 
faith.20 We have found that an employee organization breaches the duty of fair 
representation with "conduct which is arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith".21 We 
20CSEA v. PERB and Diaz, 132 AD2d 430, 20 PERB 1J7024, at 7039 (3d Dep't 
1987), affirmed on other grounds, 73 NY2d 796, 21 PERB fl7017 (1988). 
2
'PEF, AFL-CIO, 29 PERB 1J3027, at 3061 (1996). 
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have recognized that a wide latitude must be afforded to an employee organization 
regarding the investigation and processing of contract grievances.22 
In defining the duty of fair representation, we have held that the duty is in the 
nature of a fiduciary obligation owed by the employee organization to the employees 
representedbyHt^lnthis-regardrwe-have-been-guided-bydeeisions-ofthe-National 
Labor Relations Board (NLRB). The NLRB has found that as part of this fiduciary duty, 
a union has an obligation to provide employees with information regarding their terms 
and conditions of employment.24 The union has a duty not to "purposely keep 
employees uninformed or misinformed concerning their grievances or matters affecting 
employment."25 
Here, the ALJ found that the PBA breached its duty by providing the charging 
parties with information about the status of grievances and improper practice charges 
which was inaccurate and untrue. As affects these charging parties, the PBA distributed 
a list of pending matters which included Case No. U-19657, well after that matter had 
been administratively closed by the Director. The charging parties relied on that 
information as proof that the PBA was representing their interests and was upholding 
^District Council 37, AFSCME (Gonzalez), 28 PERB fl3062 (1995). 
2ZWestchester County Dep't of Corr. Superior Officers' Ass'n, Inc., 26 PERB 
113077(1993). 
24Union of Electronic, Electrical, Salaried Machine and Furniture Workers, 143 
LRRM 1235(1993). 
25Teamsters, Local 282 (Transit-Mix Concrete), 114 LRRM 1148, at 1150 (1983). 
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Article 24 of the contract. Indeed, Woods' grievance is listed as "on hold" pending the 
outcome of U-19657. The charging parties also relied on the PBA's representations 
with respect to the status of the grievances and U-19657 in the Article 78 proceeding. 
That the PBA attorney may not have informed the PBA leadership that the improper 
praetiee-Ghargehad-beendosed-does-not-relieve-thePBA-from-liabilityT-The-PBA-had 
given the attorney the authority to act on its behalf and is responsible for the acts of its 
agents, just as an employer is responsible for the acts of its agents.26 The PBA officers 
also have a responsibility to ensure that the material they disseminate to the members 
is true and accurate. We find that the PBA violated §209-a.2(c) of the Act by furnishing 
unit employees with false and inaccurate information about the status of pending 
grievances and improper practice charges. 
We further find that the PBA breached its duty of fair representation in its actions 
with respect to the Article 78 proceeding. It has long been recognized that a union 
must be and has always been afforded a wide range of reasonableness in making 
evidentiary and tactical decisions regarding the filing and prosecution of grievances.27 
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has stated that "union discretion is essential 
to the proper functioning of the collective bargaining system."28 Not wishing to substitute 
our judgment for that of the union's, we have found that with respect to the handling of 
26See Town of Huntington, 26 PERB ^3073 (1993). 
27See Airline Pilots v. O'Neill, 499 US 65, 136 LRRM 2721 (1991); Ford Motor 
Co. v. Hoffman, 345 US 330, 31 LRRM 2548 (1953). 
IBES v. Foust, 442 US 42, at 51, 101 LRRM 2365, at 2369 (1975). 
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grievances or representation in other proceedings, a union breaches the duty of fair 
representation by conduct which is arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith. Indeed, it 
has been held that allegations that a union has been careless, inept, ineffective or 
negligent in the investigation and presentation of a grievance do not evidence a breach 
oHhe-union!s-duty-offair-^^ 
regarding the investigation and processing of contract grievances is applicable when a 
union elects to expand its services to unit employees to include legal representation.30 
In so finding, we have found that a union does not breach its duty of fair representation, 
under §§209-a.2(a) and (c), when it reasonably supports the position of one or a group 
of employees to the detriment of others.31 
However, the PBA's actions here go beyond supporting one.group's interests 
over another group's interests. Until filing the motion to intervene in the Article 78 
proceeding, the PBA had assured the charging parties, as late as January 1999, that it 
was doing all it could to assist the detectives in retaining their positions and opposing 
the oral component of the examination. While Meegan told Sanford and some of the 
others at the January 1999 meeting that the PBA had had enough and would not take 
any further action on the detective examination, that was certainly no indication that the 
District Council 32, AFSCME (Gonzalez), supra note 22. 
CSEA, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, 32 PERB p011 (1999). 
See UFT, Local 2, AFT, 18 PERB 1J3048 (1985); South Huntington United 
Aides, 17 PERB 1J3012 (1984); State of New York and PEF, AFL-CIO, 14 PERB P043 
(1981). 
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PBA had changed its position with respect to the grievances and the improper practice 
charge it was processing on their behalf. While an employee organization is not bound 
to assert only the position taken by a grievant and may consider the interests of the unit 
as a whole,32 the actions of the PBA here went beyond merely asserting a contrary 
position-in-a-eourt-proeeeding-brought-b^ 
no prior warning to the affected employees, intervened in the Article 78 proceeding to 
argue a position that was contrary to its earlier stated position and was not only •• t 
detrimental to the charging parties' interests in that proceeding, but undermined the 
very basis for the grievances. 
The reasons offered by the PBA for its actions in the Article 78 proceeding do 
not answer the question of why the PBA, if it was still pursuing the class action 
grievances and the grievances filed by the individual detectives, argued against the 
very basis of those grievances in court. Clearly, the PBA must have known or should 
have known that the City would use the PBA's arguments in court against it at 
arbitration on the grievances. The PBA argues that it was concerned that the integrity of 
the examination, which by then had resulted in other unit employees being appointed to 
detective positions, was being attacked in the Article 78 proceeding. The examination is 
the issue raised by the PBA in at least one of the class action grievances. As we have 
said before, a union may support a position of one employee or a group of employees 
over the interests of other employees, but it cannot, as the PBA did here, represent to 
See Local 1359, Dist. Council 37, AFSCME, 29 PERB fi3078 (1996). 
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both groups that it is representing their interests, when in fact the positions of the two 
groups are diametrically opposed and the arguments in support of one are mutually 
exclusive of the arguments in support of the other. 
The PBA also argued against the Commission's decision to extend the date for 
grandfathering-the-deteetives-to-the-date-ofthe-examinationrwhenthe-eommission^s 
decision to do so was prompted, at least in part, by the PBA's arguments. Such an 
argument was unnecessary if the PBA was only interested in protecting the results of 
the examination. The PBA had previously announced the Commission's decision to use 
the later date to the membership as evidence of its efforts on behalf of the charging 
parties and others similarly situated. 
The PBA argues in its exceptions that the ALJ made several errors in her 
characterization of the PBA's court papers and oral argument in the Article 78 
proceeding. We find the record supports the ALJ's factual findings and analysis of this 
point. For example, the PBA did argue in its answer to the petition in the Article 78 
proceeding that the proceeding was untimely, that the charging parties' action accrued 
on December 3, 1997, and that the charging parties had no cognizable claim under 
Article 24 of the contract. None of these arguments were required in support of the 
PBA's position that the results of the examination should not be overturned by the 
court. Further, the PBA's timeliness argument was directiy contrary to the advice it had 
given to Sanford, Woods and Fritz about the time to file their grievances. 
On the basis of the record before us, we find that the PBA's actions with respect 
to both the dissemination of information to the charging parties and its position in the 
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Article 78 proceeding were misleading and arbitrary. To find a violation of §209-a.2(c) 
of the Act, we need not reach a determination that the actions of the PBA were also 
taken in bad faith.33 
The remedy ordered by the ALJ is confirmed, except as to the modification with 
respect-to-Yeates; whichisdiscussed-/A7frarThe PBA-isordered toreimbursethe 
charging parties for legal fees and related expenses incurred in the Article 78 
proceeding.34 The PBA and the City are ordered to move class action grievances 
GR98-14 and GR98-267, together with GR98-307 (Sanford), GR98-301 (Woods) and 
GR99-2 (Fritz), to arbitration. Given that the PBA has taken a position in opposition to 
the charging parties' interests in these grievances, the PBA is also ordered to incur the 
costs of hiring outside counsel to represent the charging parties in these arbitrations.35 
'While there were some allegations that the PBA's actions were racially 
motivated, we need not decide whether the PBA's actions were also discriminatory as 
no exceptions were taken to the ALJ's determination that there was insufficient 
evidence of racial discrimination on the record before her and there is no evidence that 
the PBA's actions were otherwise discriminatory. 
34See State of New York and Local 418, CSEA (Diaz), 18 PERB P047, at 3103, 
rev'd on other grounds, 132 AD2d 430, 20 PERB 1J7024 (3d Dep't 1987), aff'd on other 
grounds, 73 NY2d 796, 21 PERB fl7017 (1988), where we ordered CSEA to pay the 
charging party's reasonable legal fees and expenses to bring a lawsuit because we 
found that the union had inadequately represented the charging party in violation of its 
duty of fair representation. See also Local 342, Long Island Public Serv. Employees, 
20 PERB H3045 (1987), confirmed, 146 AD2d 775, 22 PERB H7005 (2d Dep't 1989), 
motions for leave to appeal denied, 22 PERB 1J7020 (2d Dep't 1989), and 75 NY2d 701, 
22 PERB H7038(1989). 
35We do not order, as did the ALJ, that each of the charging parties be 
considered to be a part to each of the other grievances. The class action grievances 
arguably cover all of the charging parties. We are not aware of any reason set forth in 
the ALJ's decision or present in this record to join each of the charging parties as 
parties in the individual grievances. 
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We will not, as sought by Woods and Fritz, order that the PBA reimburse them 
for their legal fees and related expenses in the prosecution of their improper practice 
charges.36 The award of costs is extraordinary and is warranted only where the 
respondent's actions have been especially egregious.37 While the PBA's actions violate 
the-Actrth-ey-do-not-rise-to-thaMeveh 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that: 
1. The Buffalo PBA cease and desist from disseminating false and/or 
misleading information regarding pending grievances and improper practice 
charges to its membership. 
2. The PBA reimburse Officers Sanford, Woods, Fritz, Hubbard, Pitts and 
Yeates for any and all reasonable legal costs and related expenses which 
they incurred in connection with the Article 78 proceedings brought in March 
1999 against the City of Buffalo and the Buffalo Municipal Civil Service 
Commission. 
3. The PBA and the City immediately move GR98-14, GR98-267, GR98-307, 
GR98-301, and GR99-2 to arbitration, and that the PBA incur the costs for 
the hiring of outside counsel to represent the charging parties in these 
proceedings. 
36Local 342, Long Island Public Serv. Employees, supra note 34. 
37
 See City of Troy, 28 PERB 1J3027 (1995), and United Fed'n of Teachers, Local 
2, NYSUT, 16 PERB ff3052 (1983). 
Board - U-20907, U-20987, U-21001, U-21005, U-21006 & U-21010 
4. The PBA sign and post the attached notice in the form attached at all 
locations ordinarily used to post written communications to unit employees. 
DATED: December 8, 2000 
Albany, New York 
•25 
_MichaelLR._CueYas)_Chairman 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the City of Buffalo (City) in the unit represented by the Buffalo Police 
Benevolent Association (PBA) that the PBA will forthwith: 
1. Not disseminate false and/or misleading information regarding pending grievances 
and improper practice charges to its membership. 
2. Reimburse Officers Sanford, Woods, Fritz, Hubbard, Pitts and Yeates for any and all 
J reasonable legal costs and related expenses which they incurred in connection with the Article 
78 proceedings brought in March 1999 against the City of Buffalo and the Buffalo Municipal 
Civil Service Commission. 
3. Together with the City, immediately move GR98-14, GR98-267, GR98-307, GR98-301, and 
GR99-2 to arbitration, and that the PBA incur the costs for the hiring of outside counsel to 
represent the charging parties in these proceedings. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
BUFFALO POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or 
covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF NIAGARA FALLS, 
Charging Party, 
-and= CASENO^U^21688 
NIAGARA FALLS POLICE CAPTAINS AND 
LIEUTENANTS ASSOCIATION, 
Respondent. 
RONALD D. ANTON, CORPORATION COUNSEL (CHRISTOPHER M. 
MAZUR of counsel), for Charging Party 
DeMARIE & SCHOENBORN, P.C. (ANTHONY J. DeMARIE of counsel), for Respondent 
AMENDED BOARD DECISION AND ORDER1 
This matter comes to us on exceptions filed by the Niagara Falls Police Captains 
and Lieutenants Association (Association) to a decision of the Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ) which found that the Association submitted nonmandatory subjects of 
negotiation to compulsory interest arbitration in violation of §209-a.2(b) of the Public 
1On November 16, 2000, we issued the original decision in this case 
(unpublished). Our decision this date corrects only a mischaracterization of the 
negotiability of a demand for certain pension benefits pursuant to §443 (f-1) of the 
Retirement and Social Security Law (RSSL). The original decision contained the 
following sentence: "Since the legislative intent expressed in §443(f-1) is unequivocal, 
the Association's argument is specious and, consequently, bargaining over the subject 
is foreclosed by the language of the statute. Proposal #13 is, therefore, not a 
mandatory subject of negotiation." That sentence was corrected because, while the 
statute prohibits the subject matter of RSSL §443 (f-1) from consideration by an interest 
arbitration panel, it does not affect the subject's negotiability, as was found by the ALJ. 
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Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) and directed the Association to withdraw its 
proposals #1 and #13 from consideration of compulsory interest arbitration. 
Based on our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
On May 4, 2000, the City of Niagara Falls (City) filed an improper practice charge 
alleging that the Association violated §209-a.2(b) of the Act by including in its petition 
for compulsory interest arbitration two proposals, to wit: proposal #1 and proposal #13, 
which are nonmandatory subjects of negotiation. 
The Association, in its answer, argued that the at-issue proposals are 
mandatorily negotiable. 
The matter was submitted to the ALJ upon the stipulated record described in the 
ALJ's letter dated June 12, 2000, consisting of the following: 
1. The Improper Practice Charge filed by the City on May 4, 2000 
and attachments thereto. 
2. The Association's Answer. 
3. The Parties' Collective Bargaining Agreement covering the 
period 1994-1996. 
4. The 1998 Interest Arbitration Award in Case No. IA97-010; 
M96-457. 
5. The following two (2) proposals included in the Association's 
Petition for Interest Arbitration which the City asserts are 
nonmandatory subjects of bargaining: 
(a) Proposal 1 - §4.04 - POSTINGS (NON-COMPETITIVE JOB 
CLASSIFICATION) 
The following to replace existing language: 
688 -3 
(THE SECTION TO BE RETITLED "NON-COMPETITIVE JOB 
CLASSIFICATIONS".) 
In the event the City decides to fill a vacancy in a non-
competitive position, or it creates a new non-competitive 
position, assignment to such vacancy shall be made by the 
City from the three (3) most senior officers who requested 
assignment and who are qualified. The qualifications will be 
fixed by the City and may not be unreasonable. 
By way of example and not by way of limitation, the following 
shall be considered as non-competitive positions: 
Assistant Superintendent, 
Detective Captain, 
Detective Lieutenant, 
NID Captain (formerly CIU Captain), 
NID Lieutenant (formerly CIU Lieutenant), 
Community Services Supervisor, 
Youth Aid Bureau Captain (formerly JAB Captain), 
Youth Aid Bureau Lieutenant (formerly JAB Lieutenant), 
Traffic Supervisor. 
Any position, which has been classified by the Public 
Employment Relations Board as "managerial or confidential" 
shall be excluded from the provisions of this section. 
Notice of vacancy and of such reasonable qualifications 
shall be posted on Department Bulletin Boards and a copy 
shall be provided to the Association for at least thirty (30) 
days before the selection is made. The position shall be 
filled within ten (10) days thereafter. 
In the event of a vacancy in a position, if no supervising 
officer indicates a desire to fill such vacancy it will be filled 
based upon inverse seniority. 
For purposes of this section seniority shall be computed 
based upon the date of appointment to the officer's present 
rank. 
(b) Proposal 13 - S12.06 - ANTICIPATED 
LEGISLATION - [NEW] 
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In the event the New York State Legislature authorizes the 
elimination of any restrictions on Tier II employees, the City 
will eliminate such restrictions. 
ALJ Decision 
The ALJ determined that the Association's proposals #1 and #13 were 
nonmandatory and/or prohibited subjects of bargaining and ordered them withdrawn 
from compulsory interest arbitration. 
Exceptions 
The Association excepted to the ALJ's decision on the facts and law. The City 
responded with a brief in support of the ALJ's decision. 
Discussion 
Association Proposal #1 
This proposal replaces existing language in §4.04 Postings, of the parties' 
collective bargaining agreement. The ALJ correctly found that qualifications for a 
position are a management prerogative and, thus, a nonmandatory subject of 
bargaining.2 Proposal #1 also set forth a procedure in which an assignment to a vacant 
position was to be made from the three (3) most senior officers. We have held, and the 
ALJ correctly noted, that the procedures to be used to fill a position, e.g., seniority, are 
a mandatory subject of negotiation.3 
2See City of Buffalo (Police Dep't), 29 PERB 1J3023 (1996); Levitt v. The Bd. of 
Collective Bargaining of The City of New York, Office of Collective Bargaining), 21 
PERB 1|7516 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1988); West Irondequoit Bd. ofEduc, 4 PERB 
113070(1971). 
3See Schenectady Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n, 21 PERB 1J3022 (1988); 
Dutchess County BOCES Faculty Ass'n, NEA/NY, 17 PERB 1J3120 (1984), confirmed 
122 AD2d 845,19 PERB 1J7018 (2d Dep't 1986); White Plains Police Benevolent Ass'n, 
9 PERB 1J3007 (1976). 
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") We turn to the Association's exceptions to the ALJ's findings based upon the 
stipulated record. 
The Association believes the ALJ erroneously determined that proposal #1 would 
require the City to fill a vacant position and was, therefore, nonmandatory. The 
Association argues that the language of proposal #1 is discretionary in that the City 
makes the initial decision to fill the vacant position and as such is subject to the duty to 
bargain.4 The problem, however, is that the language of proposal #1 incorporates 
mandatory subjects, e.g., procedure to fill a position, as well as nonmandatory subjects, 
e.g., qualifications, and filling the vacancy within a defined time (ten days). We have 
held that where a bargaining proposal contains two or more inseparable elements, i.e., 
a unitary demand, at least one of which is nonmandatory, the entire proposal is deemed 
nonmandatory.5 Consequently, we do not agree with the Association's exception and it 
is denied. 
The Association believes that the ALJ erred when she found that Association 
proposal #13 was nonmandatory. This proposal would add new §12.06 to the parties's 
collective bargaining agreement Article Xll-Miscellaneous Provisions. The language of 
§12.06 is anticipatory and it refers to amendments to §§302(9)(d) and 443(f) and (f-1) of 
the New York State Retirement and Social Security Law (RSSL). 
The language of §443(f-1) is clear that a demand in negotiations for the 
additional pension benefit provided by subdivision (f) of this section shall not be subject 
to compulsory interest arbitration, (emphasis added) Since the legislative intent 
4See County of Westchester, 33 PERB ^3025 (2000) (citing cases). 
5See Police Benevolent Ass'n of the City of White Plains, Inc., 33 PERB H3051 
(2000) (citing cases). 
Board - U-21688 -6 
expressed in §443(f-1) is unequivocal, the Association's argument is specious and, 
consequently, submitting the subject to interest arbitration is foreclosed by the language 
of the statute. Proposal #13 is, therefore, not a proper subject to present to an interest 
arbitration panel. The Association's exception is denied. 
For the reason set forth above, the ALJ's decision is affirmed and the 
Association's exceptions are dismissed. 
IT IS, HEREBY, ORDERED that the Association withdraw its proposals #1 and 
#13 from consideration at compulsory interest arbitration. 
DATED: December 8, 2000 
Albany, New York -=-• 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
A. Abbott, Member 
/John T. Mitcriell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
) PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SAANYS/ELMIRA HEIGHTS ADMINISTRATIVE 
COUNCIL, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5023 
ELMIRA HEIGHTS CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the SAANYS/Elmira Heights Administrative 
Council has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-
named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as 
their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
settlement of grievances. 
Included: High School Principal, Middle School Principal, Elementary School 
Principal and Director of Instructional Support. 
) Excluded: All others. 
i 
I 
Certification - C-5023 page 2 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the SAANYS/Elmira Heights Administrative Council. The 
duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times 
and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: December 8, 2000 
Albany, New York 
*JZ~ 
Miphael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
V 
J 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UAW LOCAL 1097, 
P_e.ti.tio.ner-, 
-and - CASE NO. C-5026 
MONROE 2-ORLEANS BOCES, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the UAW Local 1097 has been designated and 
selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in the 
unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Included: All regular full-time and part-time employees of the Elementary 
Science Program (ESP). 
Excluded: All supervisory, managerial and office clerical employees of the 
ESP. 
Certification - C-5026 page 2 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the UAW Local 1097. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with 
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a 
written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the 
making of a concession. 
DATED: December 8, 2000 
Albany, New York 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
